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Unfair Evictions: Where Fair Housing
and Landlord-Tenant Law Intersect
By Geoffrey Heeren

commonality is the summary nature of the process, a feature that often lends
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New
YorkbutTimes
recently summarized the experience of New York City Housing Court, perhaps prototypical of such courtrooms:
With its boisterous atmosphere of lawyers and tenants negotiating in crowded hallways or barking into cellphones, the housing court can be a desperately bewildering experience. While about 90 percent of the landlords have
lawyers, perhaps only 15 percent of the tenants do. And because the hearings
before the judges, who are among the most overworked in the system, are
typically brief, litigants often have just a few minutes to summarize their
predicaments.1
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Legal aid attorneys, having become singularly adept at negotiating these courts, parlay a limited arsenal of technical defenses, equitable arguments, and procedural tactics into patchwork victories for clients wholly bereft of other resources. Their
enterprise, however, can often seem sisyphusian-a curse to quash service endlessly
or iterate the argument of waiver, while the housing problems of the poor become
more and more intractable. At the same time, legal aid offices are harried, embattled, and overworked and face a steadily increasing population of clients, declining

!David W Chen, Litigants in Housing Court Fear What State Fees Will Bring, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2003. at 31. See also
Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, Hous. PoLY DEBATE14 4 (forthcoming
2003), available at wwwknowledgeplex org or wwwfanniemaefoundation.org.
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funds, and a Congress periodically controlled by hostile ideologues. 2 Having
become the favorite target of libertarian
or right-wing crusaders, programs in
legal services have a heightened wariness of controversy and increasingly tout
the number of clients that they have
advised and the number of routine cases
litigated instead of setting forth initiatives that draw attention to systemic
3
legal problems faced by the poor.
Within this bleak environment, one tool
is understandably often overlooked by
eviction lawyers-federal fair housing
Housing
The
Fair
litigation.
Amendments Act, which prohibits the
denial of "a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin," as
well as handicap, can be a natural
defense in a variety of eviction scenarios.4 Moreover, there may be occasions
where bringing a fair housing suit in
federal court against a landlord intent on
evicting a tenant can be the best if not
the easiest way to protect the tenant. For
those advocates interested in more systemic change, a prominent federal fair
housing suit may be a community organizing tool and a means to focus public
attention on the problems of the poor.5

apartment complex, where her rent is
subsidized by a "mainstream" vouchera kind of housing subsidy for disabled
persons. 6 The building is in a recently
gentrified neighborhood of skyrocketing
rents.
Suppose Ethel tells Cecilia that last year
the building was sold, and the new owner
has decided to renovate so that he can
better market units to the go -something
white professionals flooding into the
neighborhood. Believing that having
subsidized tenants in the building makes
it less palatable to yuppies, the owner
has adopted a "no Section 8" policy and
has issued "thirty-day" eviction notices
to twelve voucher-holder tenants,
including Ethel, whose leases have
expired. The thirtieth day on Ethel's
notice will pass in a week.

Imagine, for instance, that a disabled
African American woman-suppose her
name is Ethel-arrives at an intake
interview at a legal services office in a
large city. Say she tells Cecilia, the attorney who interviews her, that she has
lived for the last twelve years in a large

2

0n the current state of legal services offices see

BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, STRUGGLINGTO MEET THE NEED COMMUNITIES

BUREAU,
LEGALAID 14-15 (2003), On the increasing population of the poor see U.S CENSUS
GAPSIN FEDERAL
CONFRONT
2001 1 (2002) (about 1.3 million more people in the United States were poor in 2001 than
INTHEUNITEDSTATES:
POVERTY
in 2000). On declining funds see, e.g., Kylie Greene, Legal Aid Clients Could Be Left Without Counsel,
(Dubuque, Iowa), Feb. 16, 2003, at A17.

TELEGRAPHHERALD

3

As an example of legal services' unpopularity with the right wing, a panel of eighteen "conservative publc policy
experts," including former Rep. Dick Armey of Texas, Cato Institute Executive Vice President David Boaz, and former
Delaware Governor Pete DuPont, voted the Legal Services Corporation number one of the "ten most outrageous government programs," See Special Report. Ten Most Outrageous Government Programs, HUMAN EVENTSONLINE, Mar 10,
2003, at www.humaneventsonline.com
442 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(f) (2003); see Crystal B. Ashley, An Introduction to Fair Housing
LAW MANUAL FORTHENEWLAWYER131 (2002)
Law, in POVERTY
5

See Lucie E White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyerng and Power, 1988 Wis L. REV.699,
758 (1988). But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,THE HOLLOWHOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUTSOCIALCHANGE? (1991).
6

The Mainstream Voucher Program is a subset of the Housing Choice Voucher program, under Section 8 of the United
States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2003), and is governed by regulations at 24 C.FR pt 982
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Cecilia knows that housing advocates in
the city have attempted repeatedly and in
vain to pass legislation making it illegal
to deny housing to persons solely
because of their source of income.
Because Cecilia herself lives in the
neighborhood, she knows that Ethel and
the other voucher holders in the building will have a hard time finding a new
apartment in the area, even with the help
of their vouchers. She checks the eviction notice, finds a technical defect that
she might exploit to get Ethel more time
to move, but realizes that this is not a
true solution. She asks Ethel about the
other voucher holders and learns that all
are women, seven are African American,
three are Latino, one is Asian, and one is
Caucasian-a
breakdown
roughly
reflecting the racial demographics of
voucher holders across our hypothetical
city.
To Cecilia the "no Section 8" policy,
though facially neutral, has a disparate
impact on women and minorities, and
the landlord may be required to accept
the voucher as part of its duty to accommodate disabled residents under the
Fair Housing Act. Courts had held so far
that a landlord's refusal to accept voucher holders did not give rise to a claim of
disparate impact under the Act.7
However, a recent Ninth Circuit decision
seemed to renew hope for this type of
8
challenge.
Cecilia realizes that her office could file a
federal fair housing case to try to stop the
evictions. Aside from bankruptcy filings
and social security appeals, however, she
has not practiced in federal court, and
she took her federal courts class from a
professor who imparted little to her but a
sense of impending doom whenever she
heard the words "Rooker- Feldman."9
She now has only seven days to make a
series of quick decisions about how to

litigate Ethel's potential fair housing
claims. Should she plead a fair housing
claim as a counterclaim or affirmative
defense in the state eviction and risk the
rendering of a decision having res judicata effect by an eviction judge who may
spend only minutes hearing Ethel's
claim? Should she file an administrative
complaint with the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), an independent state court suit,
or a federal case? Should she seek to
enjoin the eviction proceeding? She
knows enough about civil procedure to
understand that the consequence of
bringing, or in some cases failing to
bring, a claim may be to lose it forever.
Here I attempt to answer some of these
questions by examining the procedural
issues unique to the context of fair housing claims arising from a prospective,
pending, or former state court eviction
suit. First, I outline some of the general
legal and strategic considerations that an
attorney and her client should weigh in
deciding where and when to bring a fair
housing claim. Second, I examine the
preclusive effect of bringing or failing to
bring the claim as a counterclaim or
affirmative defense in a state court eviction proceeding. And, third, I analyze
the effect of bringing a fair housing
claim in a federal court proceeding that
occurs contemporaneously with the
eviction or subsequent to the eviction,
with a focus upon the Anti-Injunction
Act and the federal abstention doctrines.
General Legal and Strategic
Considerations
A broad range of eviction scenarios may
implicate fair housing law. The data on
evictions are "sparse and uneven" and
yield little statistical evidence as to the
extent to which tenants raise fair housing defenses or, indeed, any defense at

7See Knapp v.Eagle Creek Apartments, 54 F3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir 1995); Salute v Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998)
8See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1153-55 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003) (holding that a landlords rejection of
a disabled tenant whose inability to work meant that he required a relative to assist him with paying rent violated the
Fair Housing Act duty to accommodate a disabled tenant).
9

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine taken from two Supreme Court cases provides that a district court may not review a
state court judgment See "Rooker-Feldman Abstention" in the main text
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all.1 0 However, the proliferation of published decisions in which higher state
courts found such defenses to be germane
indicates that the issue arises with some
frequency.1 I do not intend to catalogue
the grounds for bringing a fair housing
claim or to explicate the legal nuances of
each such claim.Y2 In any fair housing case,
however, the predominant consideration
in decidingwhether and where to bring the
claim must be the strength of that claim. If
the fair housing claim is a weak (but still
colorable) one due to the applicable law,
credibility of witnesses, or relevant facts, it
can be an affirmative defense in the eviction, but not worth "making a federal case
out of it."

of the parties) was 497 days.' 4 After
conclusion of the investigation, however, the average time for resolution of
cases appears to be shorter in cases
adjudicated by a HUD administrative law
judge than those in federal district
court. 5

The principal forums available to a fair
housing claimant include HUD's or
other similar state or local administrative agencies' hearing process, the state
eviction proceeding, an independent
state suit, and federal court. Because the
HUD administrative process involves an
investigation of the complainant's allegations, it is an opportunity to learn
more about the case. However, HUD may
be an impractical forum in cases where
tenants face imminent eviction.
The Fair Housing Act requires HUD to
complete its investigation of a complaint
within ioo days "unless it is impracticable to do so."13 A study, however, shows
that HUD regularly takes much longer.
In the 2ooo fiscal year the average number of days from the time a complaint
was received to finding cause (allowing
the complaint to proceed to adjudication
by an administrative law judge or federal
litigation, depending upon the election
10

See Hartman & Robinson, supra note 1

11See infra note 19.
12

G SCHWEMM,
For an exposition of federal civil rights laws relevant to the fair housing context, see generally ROBERT

COMMUNITY
IN REALESTATE,
FAIRHOUSINGDISCRIMINATION
(1990); JAMESA. KUSHNER,
LAW AND LITIGATION
DISCRIMINATION:
HOUSING

Civil
(2d ed. 1995); Florence Wagman Roisman, Housing, Poverty, and Racial Justice: How
ANDREVITALIZATION
DEVELOPMENT
2002).
(May-June
21
REV
CLEARINGHOUSE
36
People,
Poor
of
Problems
Rights Laws Can Redress the Housing
1342 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2003).
14

Legacy and the Challenges Ahead, in
john Relman, Federal Fair Housing Enforcement at a Crossroads: The Clinton

99,
IN AN AGE OFTERRORISM
ON CIVILRIGHTS,RIGHTSATRISK:EQUALITY
CITIZENS'COMMISSION

102 (2002).

5
1 See Michael H. Schill & Samantha Friedman, Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, N.Y. Univ Sch. of Law, Enforcing the
Schill) (finding that for the years 1997 and
Fair Housing Act 60 (Aug. 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with
court than in the U.S Department of
1998 it took 313 days longer, on average, to resolve a suit in federal district
Development).
Urban
and
Housing
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crimination is germane to the underly19
ing purpose of the eviction action. But
some states hold that discrimination
may be raised only as an affirmative
defense, and not as a counterclaim for
damages or for injunctive relief."
Other states, moreover, hold that a discrimination defense may be germane to
some kinds of evictions, but not to others, such as a case alleging nonpayment
of rent. 2 1

HUD does not have authority to enter
injunctive relief either. Rather, the Fair
Housing Act provides that, in cases
where "the Secretary concludes at any
time following the filing of a complaint
that prompt judicial action is necessary
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter," the HUD secretary may direct
for
the U.S. attorney general to file suit
6
injunctive relief in federal court.'
Both the Fair Housing Act and Section
1983 claims may be filed in state court,
and there may at times be good reasons
to do so.17 State judges or juries may be
more sympathetic, or state civil procedure may be more favorable than federal
law. Indeed, the multitude of federal
procedural hurdles discussed here is a
compelling justification for considering
state court. However, civil rights attorneys have traditionally found very good
reasons to choose a federal forum, and
here I focus primarily on this scenario.
Not all states allow a defendant in an
eviction action to plead a discrimination
claim as an affirmative defense or counterclaim. Because most states have created a summary process for evictions,
many of them exclude all counterclaims,
or at least those counterclaims or affirmative defenses that are not considered
"germane" to the issue of possession. 18
Most states hold that a defense of dis-

Some states have adopted compulsory
counterclaim rules similar to the one
used in federal courts. The federal rule
requires, in essence, that a counterclaim
be brought if it arises out of the "same
transaction or occurrence" as the opposing party's claim and if the holder of the
counterclaim serves a pleading on the
opposing party and has not already filed
the claim in another suit. 2 Where such
a rule is applicable, and a counterclaim
is not filed, the effect is the same as if it
had been brought and judgment entered
against the defendant; the claim may not
be brought in a future case.? 3 Thus, in a
state that considers fair housing claims
germane to evictions and has a compulsory counterclaim statute that it applies
to evictions, a tenant is required to file
the claim in the state eviction court if she
has not already filed elsewhere before
the deadline for answering. 4

1642 U.S.C. § 3610(e)(1) (2003).
17

5ee id. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2003) (a Fair Housing Act claim may be filed in "an appropriate United States district court
or State court ...");Howlett v.Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (holding that Section 1983 claims filed in state court
must be heard there if that tribunal considers similar state law claims).
18
1974) ("Only matters germane to the distinctive purpose of
See, e.g., Clore v.Fredman, 319 N.E.2d 18, 21 (111.
forcible entry and detainer proceedings may be introduced.").
19 See Josephinium Assocs. v.Skye Kahli, 45 P.3d 627, 632 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (cataloguing cases).
App, Ct. 1997) (holding that counterclaims see, g
20 See, e-g-, Am Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 691 N E.2d 1162, 1170 (111.
money damages are not germane to forcible entry claims); Lincoln Square Apartments, Section I, Inc. v Davis, 58 Misc. 2d
292, 295 N.YS.2d 358, 361 (N Y Civ. Ct 1968) (holding that equitable relief to renew an expired lease based on a First
Amendment claim was unavailable in a summary proceeding), aff'd, 316 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y.App. Term. 1969)
21 See, e.g., Fayyumi v City of Hickory Hills, 18 F Supp. 2d 909, 919-20 (N.D. III 1998) ("[T]he fact that the defendants may have discriminated against the plaintiffs in the past was simply not germane to the fact that the plaintiffs
faded to pay their rent in a timely manner, failed to comply with the Landlord's Five Day Notice, and that the defendants were, therefore, entitled to possession.").
22

Fed R Civ P 13(a) (2003). For a discussion of the state courts that have adopted a version of this rule, see Howard
M Enchson, Interjunsdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH, L.REv. 945, 977-78 (1998).
23

See Baker v Gold Seal Liquors Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974)

24

For a discussion of which states apply their compulsory counterclaim statute to evictions, see Kimberly E, O'Leary;
The Inadvisability of Applying Preclusive Doctnnes to Summary Evictions, 30 U. Toi L REv 49, 91-92 (1998).
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The issue of when the best time is for a ing of the eviction suit. In deciding
tenant with a defense based on fair which course to pursue, a tenant and her
housing law to file a fair housing claim in attorney should consider the relative
federal court is a particularly thorny one, strength of the discrimination claim,
which I deal with in greater detail below. whether the claim is "germane" to the
The short answer, however, is that the issue of possession under state law and
perfect moment is before the eviction whether the state has a compulsory
action is filed in state court. During this counterclaim rule. The attorney should
fleeting, -enchanted" moment when a also weigh general considerations (e.g.,
case has ripened based on a landlord's the availability of discovery and trial by
stated intent to sue, but the landlord has jury, and jury demographics) involving
not yet done so, courts have found few the relative attractiveness of the state
procedural niceties about which to quib- court compared to federal court. The
ble. That there are grounds for a federal attorney needs to weigh two additional
court to abstain in deference to state factors: the likelihood that a state court
adjudication is unlikely; there is no judgment may have preclusive effect
claim or issue preclusion; and the Anti- even if the tenant's claim is not brought;
Injunction Act does not bar enjoining and whether the state court proceeding
5
may be enjoined. These last two issues
the landlord from filing suit.?
are the subjects of "Preclusion" and
If the tenant waits a day too long, howev- "Federal-State Comity," respectively.
er, the complexity of her federal briefs
will grow exponentially. In cases where a Preclusion
federal proceeding occurs contemporaneously with a state court eviction, the The law of preclusion-the effect of a
tenant may be forced to address the decision rendered in one court upon a
Anti-Injunction Act, sundry forms of subsequent proceeding-varies widely
federal abstention, and, if the tenant is from state to state. In the context of a
unable to enjoin the state proceeding, federal court confronted with a state
possible preclusion as well. In a subse- court eviction judgment, the court
quent proceeding for damages, things should apply the preclusion law of the
may be somewhat simpler (especially if rendering state.2 7 In other circumthe tenant won the eviction case). Then a stances, the issue of which preclusion
tenant need cope only with potential law should apply is far less clear. Courts
preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doc- struggled, for instance, with the ques6
tion of which preclusion law to apply to a
trine.!
federal judgment entered in a diversityIn summary, for a tenant facing an evic- of-jurisdiction case. 2 8 Here I make no
tion against which there is a tenable attempt to survey these differences or
claim of discrimination, the most attrac- examine general principles comprehentive forum is the state eviction proceed- sively.? 9 Rather, I present only the most
ing or an independent state or federal basic overview necessary for an advocate
suit. If the tenant chooses to file a feder- to understand the issues at stake under
al suit, the tenant will face procedural the narrow set of circumstances when an
hurdles if she files anytime after the fil25
26

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 n.2 (1965).
See "Rooker-Feldman Abstention" in the main text.

See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Marrese v, Am. Acad of Orthopedic Surgeons,
470 U.S. 373 (1985); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S, 367 (1996)
27

28

5ee generally Ronan Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALEL.J.741 (1976), Stephen B.Burbank,
L. REV.
A General Approach, 71 CORNELL
InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law.
22.
note
supra
733 (1986); Erichson,
For an explication of differences in state law on issues such as mutuality, finality, and nuances in the interpretation
For a comprehensive examination of
of "same claim" and "on the merits," see Erichson, supra note 22, at 965-83
(1982).
1-42
§
LAW
THE
OF
RESTATEMENT(SECONO)
see
principles,
general
29
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eviction judgment has been entered
against a tenant who has filed or subsequently files a federal civil rights suit
against her landlord.
A tenant in such circumstances will likely be precluded from raising her fair
housing claim where she had a full and
fair opportunity to raise the claim in the
eviction action even if she failed actually
to do so. Advocates whose states provide
eviction procedures that are procedurally and substantively equivalent to those
afforded by federal law in a fair housing
suit thus need not absorb the nuances of
the following discussion; they must, in
short, plead their fair housing claims
within the eviction. Those with state
procedures that would prevent them
from receiving a full and fair hearing on
their claim, or from being awarded full
relief within the eviction, may find the
following discussion of interest.
The two principal forms of preclusion
are claim preclusion, or res judicata in
the traditional judicial lexicon, and issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel. The
conventional statement of claim preclusion is that a final, valid judgment rendered on the merits is an absolute bar in
a subsequent action between the same
parties or those in privity with them
upon the same claim. Most modern
courts have adopted a broad definition of
"same claim' that encompasses all
actions arising from the same underlying transaction. 3 ° At the time of judgment, there is said to be "merger" of the
claim with the judgment, and further
action against the defendant must be on
the judgment and not the claim.
The rule of issue preclusion is that a final,
valid judgment on the merits is an estoppel
30
3 1

between the same parties or those in privitywith them as to matters that were actually litigated and determined, even though
the claim in the subsequent action is different. In the case of both types of preclusion, the underlying policy justification is
to assure finality where the parties had a
fair and full opportunity to litigate their
case. Commentators argue that there are
strong policy reasons not to apply preclusive doctrines where the rendering court
was an eviction court, with summary proa tenant
cedures that are likely to hinder
31
from litigating all of her claims.
Nonetheless, eviction judgments are not
uncommonly found to preclude plaintiffs from bringing subsequent litigation
related to the question of possession. 3
Where the fair housing plaintiff actually
pled the fair housing claim in the eviction suit as a counterclaim and lost, or
where she pled or argued it as an affirmative defense and lost, claim or issue
preclusion probably applies, respectively. 3 3 Where the claim was not brought,
but the landlord argues that the finding
that it was entitled to possession should
preclude the tenant from later claiming
that the landlord's termination of her
possession was discriminatory, the outcome is much less clear.
Generally speaking, claim preclusion
will likely prevent the tenant from raising a fair housing claim that she could
have raised as a defense in the eviction,
even where she failed actually to raise
it. 3 4 Where, however, the tenant is not
attacking the judgment but is seeking
relief independent of possession, such
as damages for discrimination in the
terms of her tenancy, the subsequent
claim may not be precluded. 3 5

Erichson, supra note 22, at 973-74.
See O'Leary, supra note 24.

32 See, e.g., Ellis v Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Minn. 1982) (holding that plaintiff
was precluded from litigating the issue of discrimination, which he had raised as a defense in a prior eviction suit).
33

Where the defendant counterplaintiff prevailed on her claim, she may not be barred from bringing a subsequent
supra note 29, § 21.
suit, if she seeks relief that was unavailable in the eviction court. See RESTATEMENT,
34

See id. § 22(b).

35

1d. But see Fayyumi v City of Hickory Hills, 18 F Supp. 2d 909, 920 n.8 (N.D. Ill, 1998) (holding that fair housing
suit for damages was precluded to the extent that it relied upon the discriminatory motivation of the defendants for
bringing a prior eviction action).
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In response to a motion to dismiss on
the basis of claim preclusion, the tenant's strongest argument maybe that she
would have been unable to raise the
claim or would have been impaired in
doing so. Where the fair housing claim
would not have been considered germane in the eviction action, or the relief
sought would not have been obtainable,
the fair housing claim should not be precluded. 3 6 Where the state eviction court
procedures were severely truncated, the
tenant may also make a strong argument
against preclusion. Where states limit
discovery in eviction cases, mandate
quick dispositional timelines, dilute the
traditional rules of evidence, alter the
burdens of proof, or otherwise limit the
due process to which tenants are entitled, the argument against preclusion
seems compelling.
More problematic are those states that
appear, on paper at least, to have, for
adjudicating eviction suits, a system that
allows tenants to plead defenses and
counterclaims broadly without limitation on remedy, conduct discovery related to them, and obtain a trial during
which they will not be subject to unreasonable evidentiary burdens. In such
states the attorney should reconcile herself to litigating the fair housing claim in
the eviction because, whether or not she
pled the claim, any judgment entered
against her client will likely have preclusive effect on subsequently filed fair
housing claims. 37
Federal-State Comity
Federal judges often blanch at the
prospect of hearing an eviction. As one
NewYork judge said in a case where a ten-

ant attempted to remove to federal court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction:
The New York state courts are
filled with thousands of summary eviction proceedings. In
most of them the tenant seeks to
delay the process as long as possible. If we accept the removal of
these cases to federal court, we
will not only overburden the
federal system but will also
completely emasculate the state
structure for
dealing with such
38
disputes.
Perhaps based on the logic of this
doomsday scenario, jurists have drawn
from a variety of doctrines based loosely
in theories of federal- state comity when
declining to decide a case involving an
eviction. The most pertinent of these
doctrines are catalogued and analyzed
here. Before beginning this discussion, I
should briefly note that one such doctrine is not discussed below-the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction for cases
in rem or quasi in rem. I have not included substantial discussion of this doctrine because its viability as a basis for a
federal court to withhold jurisdiction in
a fair housing suit concerning an eviction appears doubtful. Courts historically have held that the first court to attach
jurisdiction over property must have
exclusive jurisdiction and that any other
suit concerning the property must be
dismissed or held in abeyance pending
the outcome of the first.39 Evictions
have been traditionally characterized as
in rem or quasi in rem.4 0 In cases where
federal courts have been asked to stay
preexisting evictions, however, they
appear to have ignored this doctrine of

36

See, e.g., Fayyumi, 18 F Supp. 2d at 919-20 (holding that an eviction judgment was not entirely res judicata as to a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 because under Illinois law the Section 3617 claim would not have been germane to a
nonpayment-of-rent case to the extent that it related to the retaliatory denial of services by the landlord); see
RESTATEMENT,supra note 29, § 26(c)(1).
37

A limited exception exists where the tenant can argue for some reason that the state court judgment is invalid See,
e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 561 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that judgment procured through fraud
does not have preclusive effect under Illinois law).
38

Glen 6 Assocs. v Oedaj, 770 F Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y 1991).

39See Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935).
40See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982); Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apartments, 210 S.E 2d
722 (Ga. 1974).
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exclusive jurisdiction or forsaken it in
favor of the highly manipulable balancing
41
tests of the various abstention doctrines.
The Anti-Injunction Act. The AntiInjunction Act deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction to "grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 4 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has so far clearly delineated only one statute that
"expressly authorizes" enjoining state
3
court proceedings: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
Although appellate courts found various
other statutes to meet the requirements
of the test set forth by the Court for
determining whether an injunction was
"expressly authorized," the First Circuit
held that the Fair Housing Act was not
one of these. 4 4 Unless the tenant can
show "state action" sufficient to bring
her civil rights claim under the guise of a
Section 1983 claim, she is unlikely to
45
meet the "expressly authorized" test.
The "protect or effectuate judgments"
exception is similarly unhelpful, having
been construed to apply only to issues

that have been fully and finally adjudicated.4 6 Because it comes into play for
the most part under circumstances
where a state court is flouting an already
existing federal judgment, it is unlikely
to be relevant in the average fair housing
eviction scenario.
The "in aid of jurisdiction" exception
has been widely applied to in rem suits,
"where, to give effect to its jurisdiction,
47
the court must control the property."
(In contrast, courts have been reluctant
to enjoin a state proceeding based on the
"in aid of jurisdiction" exception where
both the federal and state cases are in
personam and involve the same subject
matter.)48 Under traditional principles,
the exception was applied with rigid
chronological logic to enjoin only laterfiled suits. In a sparse line of cases, however, courts have relied upon this exception to enjoin evictions, regardless of
when they were filed. 4 9 These cases did
not focus upon the in rem nature of the
proceedings but relied instead on the
rationale that if the court did nothing,
the tenants would be evicted, and that it
appeared that the tenants would be
unable to raise their federal claims
effectively in state court. 5 0

41See, e.g., Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) (holding that under the Emergency Price Control Act a federal
court could enjoin, without addressing the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, a state court eviction filed by a landlord
who did not want families with children); SEC v. Wenecke, 622 02d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980) (although assuming arguendo that evictions are quasi in rern, nonetheless holding that a state court eviction could be stayed); Sladek v Deplomb,
981 F Supp, 1364 (D. Colo. 1997) (applying the multifactor Colorado River abstention analysis in a case where tenants
filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against landlords who had filed an eviction
action against the tenants in state court).
4228 U.S.C. § 2283(2003).
43

See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

44On statutes found to meet the expressly authorized test, see, e.g., Zajac v Fed. Land Bank, 887 F.2d 844, 855-56
(8th Cic 1989) (Agricultural Credit Act falls within the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act),
rev'd en banc on other grounds, 909 F2d 1181 (1990), on the Fair Housing Act failing to meet the expressly authorized test, see Casa Marie Inc. v Superior Court of PR, 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1993).
45

NAHMOD, CML
For a discussion of state action and action taken "under color of state law," see generally SHELDON
LTIGAVONTHELAW OFSECTION1983 § 2 (4th ed. 2002).
ANDCIVILLIBERTIES
RIGHTS
46

See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F2d 527 (6th Cir 1978).

47

See Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).

48See Atl. Coast Line R.R Co. v Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S 281, 295-96 (1970)
49See Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass'n, No 90-0049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3285 (D.D.C Mar, 26, 1990),
McNeil v. N.Y City Hous, Auth., 719 F Supp. 233, 256 (S.DN Y 1989), Caulder v, Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F2d 998,
1002 (4th Cir 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) But see Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, No 00 Civ 9626, 2001
U.S Dist. LE\I> 11291 (S D.N.Y. June 13, 2001) (Magistrate's Recommendation).
50

Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass'n, 1990 U.S Dist LEXIS 3285 at *14, McNeil, 719 F Supp at 255;
Caulder, 433 F2d at 1002.
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The "in aid of jurisdiction" logic also evictions, unless the government is a party
lends itself to the generous language of to the eviction suit. 5 4 Nonetheless, the
the All-Writs Act, which provides that doctrine has so expanded since its incep"[t]he Supreme Court and all courts tion that its appearance in a defendant's
established by Act of Congress may issue brief in a fair housing case is foreseeable.
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and In its original form, Younger required fedagreeable to the usages and principles of eral courts to withhold equitable relief to
law." 5 1 Sometimes viewed as an affirma- avoid undue interference with a pending,
tive grant of power to the courts, and at ongoing state criminal proceeding except
others as an exception to the Anti- under "special circumstances," such as
Injunction Act, the All-Writs Act has prosecutorial bad faith or a blatant and flabeen cited as additional authority for grant unconstitutional construction. It has
staying pending state cases in order to since been applied to civil enforcement
protect a proposed settlement agree- proceedings and civil actions involving
ment in federal class action litigation.52 certain orders uniquely in furtherance of
The All-Writs Act has also been used the state courts' ability to perform their
with increasing frequency to justify judicial functions.55 Such cases have typiremoval of a state action that would cally been those in which the state is a party
interfere with a federal judgment or to the state court litigation, and among the
consent decree.5 3 Where a court is factors analyzed by courts making a Younger
deterred from relying on the "in aid of holding is a requirement that an important
jurisdiction" exception because of the in state interest be implicated by the state
personaam character of the federal action, case. The Younger test in essence requires
or because the state eviction was first federal courts to abstain from enjoining an
filed, the All-Writs Act could provide a ongoing state judicial proceeding that
implicates important state interests where
rationale for staying the state eviction.
there is an adequate opportunity in the
Whether under the "in aid of jurisdic- state proceedings
to raise constitutional
6
tion" exception or the All-Writs Act, the challenges.5
argument for enjoining the eviction
remains the same. Just as with claim Courts almost uniformly hold that there
is no important state interest in a wholly
preclusion, an advocate must point to
private dispute between a landlord and a
the state law barriers to effective litigatenant.57 Even in a case where one of the
tion of the federal claim in state court.
parties was a public housing authority, a
"Younger" Abstention. As currently for- state actor, the court held that the dismulated, the abstention doctrine of pute was like one between purely private
Younger v. Harrisshould be inapplicable to litigants.5 8 Where the state or local gov-

5128 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2003).
52
53

5ee In Re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 FR.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier in Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All-Writs Act, 80 B.U.L. REV.773

(2000).
54
55
56

Younger v. Harris, 401 US. 37 (1971).
See New Orleans Pub, Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (describing cases).
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

57

See Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, 00 C 9626, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11291, *22, n. 11 (S.DN.Y. June 13, 2001);
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F Supp. 2d 184, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), Usher v Waters Ins. &
Realty Co., 438 F Supp. 1215, 1220 (W.D.N C 1977); Litteral v. Bach, 869 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir 1989). But see
Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134 F Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 (D. Iowa, 2002) (relying on precedent of questionable
value to find an important state interest in evictions),
58

McNeil, 719 F Supp. at 255, n.27. Cf. Owens v. Hous. Auth. of Stamford, 394 F Supp. 1267, 1270-71 (D. Conn.
1975) (holding that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the issues in the case primarily involved federal and
not state law); Skinner v. Boston Hous. Auth., 690 F Supp. 109, 110-11 (D. Mass. 1988) (same)
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ernment is truly a party in the pending
state proceeding, courts, however,
applied Younger abstention. 5 9

Rooker-Feldman abstention. 6 3 While
Rooker-Feldman abstention allows a federal
court to abstain where there have beenfor"Booker- Feldman" Abstention. Although mer state court proceedings in which judgreferred to as an abstention doctrine, ment has been entered, Colorado River
Rooker-Feldman is, in essence, a kind of allows a court to abstain in deference to a
federal common-law preclusion. It pro- pending state proceeding. Underlying both
vides that lower federal courts may not types of abstention is a conflation of
exercise jurisdiction over claims that abstention doctrines with those of claim
would require them to review a final judg- and issue preclusion. In the case of
ment of a state court. 6 , Courts look to ColoradoRiver abstention, it is a concern for
"whether the injury alleged by the federal the possibility of preclusion, combined
plaintiff resulted from the state court judg- with an interest in judicial economy motiment itself or is distinct from that judg- vating the doctrine.64
ment" or, in other words, whether the Where a tenant
can argue that the state
injury is "inextricably intertwined" with court
action will not result in claim
the state judgment. 1 In practice, the
preclusion, she should be able to avoid
Rooker-Feldman analysis seems to conColorado River abstention. 6 5 Otherwise,
dense, in federal suits concerning evicshe will need to construct arguments
tions, to the same set of inquiries as those
based on the multifactor test6set forth by
6
relevant to preclusion. Where federal
the Court in Colorado River.
claims would not have been available in an
eviction, courts find Rooker-Feldman inap- "Pullman" and "Burford" Abstention.
plicable; where they could have been The Pullman abstention doctrine allows a
brought
abstain. 6 2 or were brought, the courts federal court to stay federal proceedings
until state resolution of unsettled matters
of state law that bear directly on the
"Colorado River" Abstention. Advocates
case.67 The doctrine, as such, is likely to
might think of Colorado River abstention,
come up in eviction cases only where tenwhich provides that a federal court may,
ants challenge state eviction law itself as
under "exceptional circumstances," refuse
being unconstitutional. In Troupe v.
to decide a case in deference to a parallel
Fairview Apartments, for instance, the
state proceeding, as a kind of preemptive
59

Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Younger abstention
applied where the plaintiff landlords, landlord association, and tenants sought to enjoin an action filed by the city to
enforce its land-use ordinance)
60

See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); DC Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S, 462 (1983)

6 1

Garry v. Geils, 82 F3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996).

62 Compare Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558-60 (7th Cir, 1999) (holding that because an eviction
defendant would not have been able under Illinois law to raise claims for money damages under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and Section 1983 in a forcible case, Rooker-Feldman did not bar her subsequently raised federal claims), with Gerontis v. Schwartz, No. 98 Civ. 289, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39928 (S.D.N.Y Mar 31, 1999) (without
citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that abstention was appropriate where a tenant had brought a Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act claim in an eviction, filed a postjudgment motion to reconsider, and removed to federal bankruptcy court).
63

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v, United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).

64

See Calvert Fire Ins. Co v, Am. Mut Reinsurance Co,, 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) ("A suit is
'parallel'
when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum,
thus making it likely that judgment in one suit will have a res judicata effect on the other suit.").
65

See "Preclusion" in the main text. Cf. Sladek, 981 F. Supp. at 1364 (applying Colorado River abstention
in a RICO
case filed by tenants where the court found that the state eviction court was able to decide the RICO claim).
66

The factors include the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation,
and the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818,
67

Railroad Comm'n of Tex v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
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court applied the Pullman abstention
doctrine to a case where subsidized tenants sought to challenge the constitutionality of the state eviction statute,
which did not require good cause for
eviction. The court found the tenants'
interpretation of the state law to be
questionable and ruled that "the state
courts should be given the opportunity to
interpret state statutory procedures so as
to comply with it."6 8 In such cases, tenants can avoid a Pullman abstention ruling by successfully arguing that the state
law is unambiguous and clearly improper on its face.69 Where a federal court
abstains on Pullman grounds, the tenant
may reserve her claim for federal adjudication after conclusion of the state
proceeding if she does not submit the
federal claim to the state court and
explicitly notes her intention to reserve
it.70 She still runs the risk, however, of
issue preclusion.
Similar to the Pullman doctrine is the
still more amorphous Burford abstention
doctrine, which allows abstention in
cases presenting difficult state law questions that bear on policy issues of "public import whose importance transcends
7
the result in the case then at bar." 1
Burford has given rise to far-reaching
progeny, which might make it an attrac-

tive precedential basis for abstention
from a fair housing case involving an
eviction.72

Although traditionally Burford abstention was limited to cases that would
require interference with a state administrative proceeding or order, some
courts have extended it to cases where a
state regulatory scheme merely exists,
whether or not any proceeding is pending.7 3 Moreover, state courts have been
found to be an "administrative body" for
purposes of Burford abstention, at least
in cases where a judge arguably has an
administrative function, such as authorizing an abortion in the absence of
parental consent.74
In jurisdictions that have an administrative eviction scheme, Burford could be a
dangerous rationale for abstention.75
Even where the eviction proceeding is
judicial, the mutable logic of Burford
could still emerge, although Burford
abstention in such a case would seem
poorly
supported
by
existing
precedent.7 6 Advocates can point, in
addition to other arguments against
Burford abstention, to the substantial
precedent from Younger suits holding
that landlord-tenant cases do not
involve an important state interest or, in
other words, that the eviction involves

68

Troupe v. Fairview Apartments, 464 F Supp. 234, 235 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); see also Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n,
268 F.3d at 806 (staying federal case filed by tenants, landlords, and a landlord association until the parties had the
opportunity to litigate the validity of a land-use ordinance under Washington law in Washington state court).
69

See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 62 (1972) (declining to abstain where eviction statute challenged as unconstitutional was clear on its face, had been in effect for over 100 years, and had been substantially interpreted by courts).
70
71

England v. La. Sch. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (construing Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).

72

See 1A JAMESWM. MOORE,MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE0.203[2] (2d ed. 1996) (construing Alabama Public Service
Commission Railway Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951), and Kelly Services. Inc. v Johnson, 542 F2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976)).
73

See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding Burford abstention warranted in a case
filed under the Endangered Species Act concerning an aquifer in spite of the absence of any pending administrative
order or proceeding, and the fact that the "comprehensive regulatory scheme" was not fully in place), rehearing en
banc denied, 118 F.3d 1580 (5th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1089 (1998).
74

5ee Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459, 464 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting "a federal court's responsibility
to avoid usurping a state's authority to supervise its own administrative body, in this case the state judiciary as it implements regulations of minors' abortions").
75

See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 201G-53 (2003) (granting the Housing and Community Development Corporation of
Hawaii the authority to conduct an administrative eviction hearing); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 201G-55 (2003) (granting the
aforementioned development corporation the authority to issue and enforce a writ of possession).
76 For a case that followed the logic of Burford, without citing it, see Glen 6 Assocs., 770 F Supp. at 228 ("the law of
landlord/tenant relations is strongly grounded in public policy...").

Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy

m November-December 2003

Unfair Evictions

no "questions of state law of substantial
public import."77

Conclusion

The abuse of summary eviction procedures by landlords retaliating or discriminating against their tenants is a
significant problem faced by the poor,
one that is efficiently obfuscated by the
volume of caseloads of eviction courts.
The occasional filing of a meritorious
federal suit challenging a discriminatory
eviction can highlight a systemic problem like this one. 8 ° Such litigation has
the potential to focus the attention of the
media, the public, and policymakers and
to mobilize clients to speak for them8
selves. 1

Federal litigation can be complex and
time-consuming. An attorney might
represent a dozen defendants in state
eviction court or undertake a substantial
community education project during the
time that it takes to brief the sole issue of
whether the federal court has jurisdiction to hear a tenant's claim. Still, part of
the mission of legal services since
inception has been to bring to bear on
behalf of the poor "afull range of service This is not to say that the ultimate goal of
and advocacy tools-a range as full as that fair housing litigation should be other
offered by private attorneys for the afflu- than to prevail on behalf of a client with
ent."78 If this ideal has survived, it is a a concrete need, or that such success is
strong rationale for federal litigation, impossible. In spite of the procedural
which now, more than ever, is the modus nuances set out here, attorneys have
operandi of the very well-heeled. prevailed in federal cases where land(Because the Administrative Office of lords attempted to use state eviction
the U.S. Courts does not maintain statis- proceedings in the service of malice,
tics on the number of cases filed each prejudice, or callous ignorance. In cases
year in forina pauperis, comparing the like these, filing a federal fair housing
number of cases brought by the affluent suit may simply be the best way to proand those filed by the indigent is diffi- tect a person's rights.
cult. Clearly, however, the legal needs of
the poor go largely unmet, in part due to Author's Acknowledgments
the cost of obtaining representation, and
litigants are most likely to represent I would like to thank Professors Florence Wagman
Roisman, John S. Elson, and Helen Hershkoff, as well
themselves in state specialist courts as Sharon K. Legenza of the Chicago Lawyers'
rather than federal court.)79
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, my wife,
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See "Younger Abstention" in the main text and supra note 57.
Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons. Legal Services for the Poor--a Commentary, 83 GEO.L.J
1669, 1684-85

(1995).
79 See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts: Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff,
16 NOTRE
DAMEJL.
ETics & PUB.POLY475, 481-84 (2002); Michael J. Sniffen, Poor Left Behind as Courts Go High-Tech, ASSOCLATED
PRESS,
Oct. 11, 2003, www. washingtonpost.com.
8OThis is what Lucie E. White refers to as "law as a public conversation": "Even when it does not succeed, well-crafted litigation can reveal the law systematically working to contain grievances. Litigants, by reformulating legal norms in
light of their intuitions and experience, can project visions that expand the range of social options." White, supra note
5, at 758.
81

1d. But see Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE
L.J. 1049 (1970) (arguing that traditional litigation-focused poverty lawyering does little but condition the poor to rely on lawyers rather than themselves).
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